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The year 2014 was a special one for Euro-Mediter-
ranean relations, insofar as it was the first year of 
implementation of the 2014-2020 Multiannual Fi-
nancial Framework (MFF). The European Neigh-
bourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which 
served as the legal basis for financial cooperation for 
all countries covered by the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP) and Russia from 2007 to 2013, 
has been replaced by a new European Neighbour-
hood Instrument (ENI).
At the same time, the EU proposed negotiations 
concerning Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Areas (DCFTA), which are part of the revision of the 
ENP begun in 2011 – but that were also presented/
put forth as a response to the Arab Spring – to Mo-
rocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. These negotiations 
constitute a second essential element of the eco-
nomic and financial Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
They began with Morocco and are in an exploratory 
stage with the three other partners.
The 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial 
Framework: Europe in the World and the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument
It was in February 2013 that the European Council 
reached a political agreement on the “maximum total 
figure for expenditure for EU 28 for the period 
2014-2020 is €959,988 million in appropriations 
for commitments, representing 1.00% of EU Gross 
National Income.”1 Under Heading 4, “Global Eu-
rope” (58,704 million euros in commitment appro-
priations), the European Council underscored that 
the financing instruments should support the fo- 
llowing goals: “support the objectives of promoting 
EU values abroad, projecting EU policies in sup-
port of addressing major global challenges, in-
creasing the impact of EU development coopera-
tion, investing in the long-term prosperity and sta-
bility of the EU’s Neighbourhood, supporting the 
process of EU enlargement, enhancing European 
solidarity following natural or man-made disasters, 
improving crisis prevention and resolution and 
combating climate change.” It also specified that 
“Where appropriate and subject to objective crite-
ria, support to partners will be adapted to their de-
velopment situation and commitment and progress 
with regard to human rights, democracy, the rule of 
law and good governance.”2
These conclusions are particularly important. First of 
all, it confirms that the “long-term prosperity and sta-
bility of the EU’s Neighbourhood” is a priority of for-
eign action for the EU as a whole, and moreover, the 
principles of differentiation and enhanced incentive 
conditionality (“more for more”) affect not only the 
ENP but the ensemble of foreign action.
In parallel to negotiations on the 2014-2020 MFF, 
discussions on the main sectoral policies were like-
wise held as part of ordinary legislative procedure. 
With the ENPI expiring on 31 December 2013, the 
Geographical Overview | The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Others Actors
Entry into Force of the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Negotiation 
of “Deep and Comprehensive” Free Trade 
Areas: A European Neighbourhood 
Policy Running at Different Speeds
1 EUCO 37/13, Point 6, p. 3 (for more information, see Bibliography).
2 EUCO 37/13, Point 94, p. 38.
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ENI was to replace it as of 1 January 2014, but dis-
cussion with the European Parliament has delayed 
its publication in the Official Journal of the European 
Union (OJEU) by several months.
The European Neighbourhood Instrument: 
Stepping Up Differentiation, Conditionality 
and the Role of the European Parliament 
The proposal made by the European Commission 
concerning the “Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument” (ENI)3 identified seven 
key elements by which to revise the ENPI. The ENI 
should namely:
i) Apply the principles of “more for more” and mu-
tual accountability;
ii) Streamline the programming process; 
iii) Streamline the scope of the Instrument (striking 
a balance between flexibility, strategic goals and 
key areas of cooperation); 
iv) Improve coherence among external instruments;
v) Improve cross-border cooperation; 
vi) Promote closer links with EU internal instru-
ments and policies; 
vii) Respond to the evolving relationship with Rus-
sia, an EU neighbour and strategic partner.
All of these elements are included in “Regulation 
(EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 11 March 2014 Establishing a Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Instrument.”
Two essential points should be considered regard-
ing the values and conditionality on which the ENI is 
based. With regard to values, the general objective 
of the ENI is to develop “a special relationship 
founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual 
accountability and a shared commitment to the uni-
versal values of democracy, the rule of law and re-
spect for human rights in accordance with the [Trea-
ty of the European Union (TEU)]” (Art. 1 § 1 of the 
ENI). In contrast, the ENPI only referred to the EU 
values and not to “universal values” (Art. 1 § 3 of the 
ENPI). The issue not only of the universality but also 
the “indivisibility” of human rights is mentioned in the 
ENI (Art. 1 § 1 and 4), which is a novelty. 
With regard to conditionality, it is now indicated, on 
the level of more specific objectives (Art. 2 § 1), 
that Union Support “shall focus on promoting en-
hanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable 
democracy, progressive economic integration and 
a strengthened partnership with societies.” The 
question of the implementation of enhanced condi-
tionality (“more for more”) is discussed in Article 4, 
on Differentiation. It includes a series of more pre-
cise criteria to be taken into account in the alloca-
tion of financial packages, among them not only the 
partner country’s “commitment to and progress in 
implementing mutually agreed political, economic 
and social reform objectives” and “commitment to 
and progress in building deep and sustainable de-
mocracy” but also its “absorption capacity” and the 
“potential impact of Union support under this Reg-
ulation.” These first components are consolidated 
in the second paragraph, which stipulates that “the 
share of available resources offered to partner 
countries shall be adapted primarily according to 
their progress in building and consolidating deep 
and sustainable democracy and in implementing 
agreed political, economic and social reform objec-
tives, in line with the incentive-based approach.” It 
is also stipulated that “the progress of partner 
countries shall be regularly assessed, in particular 
by means of ENP progress reports which include 
trends as compared to previous years” and that 
“support may be reconsidered in the event of 
serious or persistent regression.” The revision 
of the ENP initiated in 2011 becomes a reality here, 
in 2014, in operational terms. Incentive-based 
3 The proposal can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/documents/prop_eu_neighbourhood_instrument_reg_en.pdf
The “long-term prosperity and 
stability of the EU’s 
Neighbourhood” is a priority of 
foreign action for the EU as a 
whole, and moreover, the principles 
of differentiation and enhanced 
incentive conditionality affect not 
only the ENP but the ensemble of 
foreign action
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conditionality, closely linked to the principle of dif-
ferentiation, is clearly reinforced.
It is also noteworthy that the ENI is entering into effect 
within a context where the European Parliament (EP)’s 
powers are strengthened on the budgetary level. This 
has a direct impact on aid administration. Hence the 
annex to the ENI Regulation entitled “Statement by the 
European Parliament on the suspension of assistance 
granted under the financial instruments.” The latter in-
dicates that the EP should be able to exercise its pre-
rogatives in case of suspension of “assistance in cas-
es where a beneficiary country fails to observe the 
basic principles enunciated in the respective instru-
ment and notably the principles of democracy, rule of 
law and the respect for human rights.” A second state-
ment, i.e. “Declaration by the European Commission 
on the strategic dialogue with the European Parlia-
ment” allows the Commission to “conduct a strategic 
dialogue with the European Parliament prior to the 
programming of the Regulation” establishing the ENI. 
This dialogue shall regard the “indicative allocations 
foreseen per country/region, and, within a country/re-
gion, priorities, possible results and indicative alloca-
tions foreseen per priority for geographic programmes, 
as well as the choice of assistance modalities.” It is 
further stated that the “European Commission will take 
into account the position expressed by the European 
Parliament on the matter.” In addition, such dialogue 
shall also take place “in preparing the mid-term review 
and before any substantial revision of the program-
ming documents during the period of validity of this 
Regulation.” The ENP could thus become politicised, 
with all of the implications that would entail, but the EP 
only has the power to express its opinion, even if po-
litical pressure is always effective. Let us hope above 
all that debate will be transparent.
Insofar as the financial envelope and its breakdown, 
Article 17 states that “for the period from 2014 
to 2020” it will be “EUR 15,432,634,000 at current 
prices.” Annex II, under “Priorities for Union support 
under this Regulation” provides the following indica-
tive breakdown: “bilateral programmes: up to 80%; 
multi-country programmes: up to 35%;” and “cross-
border cooperation: up to 5%.”4 There is thus sig-
nificant flexibility and this could strengthen differen-
tiation even more.
Negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas (DCFTA)
It was in June 2011 that the Foreign Affairs Council 
invited the European Commission to “submit recom-
mendations for negotiating directives for DCFTAs 
with selected Southern Mediterranean partners”5 
insofar as initiatives “aimed at enhancing trade and 
investment relations with partners engaged in demo-
cratic and economic reforms.”6 In December 2011, 
The European Council “authorised the Commission 
to open bilateral negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia, with a view to establishing 
‘deep and comprehensive’ free trade areas, as part 
of the existing Euro-Mediterranean association 
agreements with those countries.”7 These Mediter-
ranean Partner Countries (MPCs) were selected be-
cause, in addition to their own political will, they are 
also participating in the Agadir Process, they con-
cluded their Euro-Mediterranean Association Agree-
ments (EMAAs) relatively early (Tunisia and Morocco 
in particular) and three of them have advanced sta-
tus or special partnerships with the EU. They are 
also engaged in economic and political reform, 
whether as part of violent transition processes of a 
revolutionary nature (Egypt and Tunisia) or more pa-
cific reform processes, in particular constitutional 
reform (Morocco and Jordan), although the fact re-
mains that the entire region has been affected by the 
wave of protest that began in southern Tunisia.
This enhanced integration essentially consists, for 
the time being, in enhancing and completing existing 
EMAAs. The latter continue to serve as the frame of 
reference because they already cover:
i) Liberalisation of industrial products under spe-
cific tariff dismantling schedules spanning 12 
years on average;
4 Article 17 and Annex II, respectively, Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establish-
ing a European Neighbourhood Instrument http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232.
5 2008/0095(COD) - 20/06/2011 Debate in Council - Legislative summary http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1157372&l= 
en&t=E.
6 Point 5, “European Neighbourhood Policy review”, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-181_en.htm.
7 Press Release, 3136th Council meeting - Foreign Affairs & Trade, Geneva, 14 December 2011, European Council - PRES/11/498, 14/12/2011, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-11-498_en.htm.
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ii) The principle of liberalisation of services and 
capital through general clauses to be comple-
mented by bilateral sectoral agreements or in-
cluded in the DCFTAs;
iii) Liberalisation of trade in agricultural products 
(which is mentioned in a clause on negotiation 
meetings and takes shape through the conclu-
sion of bilateral agricultural agreements annexed 
to the EMAAs);
It is thus not yet a question of negotiating a new gen-
eration of agreements as such, but the issue should 
be raised on the medium term.
The term ‘comprehensive’ means 
that the liberalisation foreseen in the 
EMAAs should be finalised insofar 
as (processed) agricultural products 
and services
To gain a thorough understanding of this qualitative 
jump ahead, we must delve into the notions of “‘deep’ 
and ‘comprehensive’ free trade.” The term ‘compre-
hensive’ means that the liberalisation foreseen in the 
EMAAs should be finalised insofar as (processed) 
agricultural products and services. According to Ar-
ticle XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), in order to be compatible with multi-
lateral regulations, a free trade area should cover 
“substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territo-
ries.”8 The term ‘deep’ means that integration will go 
beyond tariff liberalisation for industrial and agricul-
tural goods and services to focus on the question of 
non-tariff trade obstacles. The aim is to reach con-
vergence in regulations and definitively in trade. This 
also entails significant legislative alignment by the 
MPCs with the EU acquis. ENP Action Plans are to 
play a key role in this regard. In any case, Partners 
must identify the key sectors for regulatory conver-
gence and legislative alignment.
Insofar as the state of negotiations, Morocco serves 
as a reference for the South because its negotia-
tions with the EU officially began in late April 2013. 
They have focussed primarily on services and public 
markets, competition law and intellectual property 
rights. Jordan seems to be the next in line, since the 
process preliminary to launching negotiations is 
quite advanced, several meetings having already 
taken place. With regard to Tunisia, the preliminary 
process began in 2012 and focuses on the spheres 
of services and agricultural products. Exploratory 
discussions were launched with Egypt in June 2013 
but, for the moment, it seems the latter are at a 
standstill. Let us recall that on the level of Associa-
tion Agreements including a DCFTA with Eastern 
Neighbours, Georgia and Moldavia signed in No-
vember 2013, whereas Ukraine signed the political 
facet in March 2014 and will enjoy unilateral trade 
concessions.
The conclusion is clear: the implementation of the 
ENI and progress in DCFTA negotiations will in-
crease differentiations between Partners and we 
may witness a progressive politicisation of financial 
cooperation, given the increased role of the EP on 
budgetary matters. 
Countries such as Syria and Libya, which have al-
ways been special cases in Euro-Mediterranean re-
lations, are greatly marginalised today. Algeria seems 
frozen after the presidential elections, whereas Leb-
anon remains at the mercy of the aggravated secu-
rity situation in Syria. Egypt and Jordan, two coun-
tries more involved in the ENP, are also facing 
considerable challenges. Only Morocco and Tunisia 
seem to be undertaking this second stage of the 
ENP with greater serenity. It would therefore be wise 
to ensure the reactivation and development of re-
gional Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. An excess 
of bilateralism and concentration on the more ad-
vanced countries could, in fact, lead to a fragmenta-
tion of rapprochement with European, to the detri-
ment of regional Euro-Mediterranean integration and 
8 GATT: Paragraph 8 (a)(i), Article XXIV, World Trade Organization, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm.
The term ‘deep’ means that 
integration will go beyond tariff 
liberalisation for industrial and 
agricultural goods and services to 
focus on the question of non-tariff 
trade obstacles
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leave out the populations precisely aspiring to great-
er freedom and prosperity, while consolidating an 
ENP running at different speeds. It remains to be 
seen what the impact of a possible politicisation of 
financial cooperation would be, or whether the Mem-
bers of the European Parliament will manage to go 
beyond traditional political rifts and the exploitation 
of EU aid to purely national political ends.
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